Unlike other naval powers, the United States Navy clings to Mahanian theory as rationale for its force structure and strategy. The foundation upon which modern naval strategy is built is fatally flawed, relying on dubious theory, and selectively listening to the echoes of history. But the reason we assume China will engage at sea and play our game is unclear. Today our formidable Navy is preparing for battle with gusto, stressing capital ship power-namely, aircraft carriers-to execute Mahanian style battle in an offensive strategy, seeking out and destroying the enemy at sea. Many navalists wonder if De Tag! is upon us once again. War, it is said, will hinge upon US naval power being able to engage the Chinese navy successfully, to ensure command of the sea and theoretical victory. Dark quotations from the “ Thucydides Trap” and dire warnings of how China’s militarization of man-made islands will somehow close the South China Sea are frequently predicted to result in any number of global catastrophes. The fact that China is building a modern navy is viewed by Western analysts with alarm, but not panic. But another echo is also starting to ring-namely, the presumption that competition will inevitably lead to war. Most often, history’s echoes ring painfully familiar and today’s great power competition-a thinly disguised reference in US strategic parlance to competition specifically with China-is no exception. Of course, history never really repeats itself, but its echoes tend to carry forward into modern times. Ironically, when war finally came the supposedly decisive naval battle of World War I at Jutland was anything but decisive-Mahan’s theory of naval warfare was instead shown to be decisively misguided. According to Alfred Thayer Mahan, eliminating an enemy fleet by capital ships-a navy’s most important ships, typically the largest and leading or primary ships in a naval fleet-in a decisive battle would not only win command of the sea, but would also win the war. The ruling classes and top theorists became firmly entrenched in an ethos of then-modern conflict that demanded expansion, expected conflict with other great powers, and predicted a great naval battle for command of the sea. For navalists, a battle between the world’s greatest navies was a certainty.įor the US Navy and other great navies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Mahanian theory predicting a decisive battle at sea between the world’s great powers has dominated strategy discussions. At the dawn of the twentieth century, it was not uncommon to hear British and German naval officers toasting with De Tag! (To the Day!) and to clink their raised glasses in the acknowledgement that they would one day meet in a decisive battle at sea. Around the globe, naval forces have long been the power of empires and used to extend a nation’s reach beyond its geographic homeland. US naval power and strategy has a rich history that includes epic battles, catastrophic losses, and stalwart traditions. That the photo was taken by an antisubmarine helicopter hovering over the submarine was lost in the initial wave of reactions but the point was clear: a new, modern force had arrived, and it posed a direct threat to our primary naval strike power. The picture clearly showed a Chinese submarine, periscope raised, with the USS Kitty Hawk in the background. In 2006 the United States Navy published a startling photograph.
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